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Introduction
Status is an important determinant for human behavior, a proposition that is supported by psychologists and economists alike (e.g. Frank, 1988 , Huberman et al., 2004 , Moldovanu et al., 2007 . Status concerns are particularly important at work; people spend much of their time at the workplace, and their behavior at work is an important determinant of an economy's e¢ ciency. The goal of gaining higher status in an organization motivates people to work hard for long periods of time; examples from the academic world, law …rms, investment banks, and consulting …rms abound. Making partner at a law …rm, or getting tenure in a university provides much stronger motivation than just getting a wage rise.
Chester Barnard (1938, p.145) , the …rst modern management theorist, was well aware of the relevance of status for motivation and the necessity to provide both monetary rewards and status: "Even in strictly commercial organizations, where it is least supposed to be true, money without distinction, prestige, position, is so utterly ine¤ective that it is rare that greater income can be made to serve even temporarily as an inducement if accompanied by surpression of prestige." Peter Drucker (1954, p. 154 ) expressed similar thoughts: "But …nancial rewards are not enough. People, whether managers or workers, whether in business or outside, need rewards of prestige and pride." Indeed, most organizations do not only provide monetary incentives, but they also allocate status between workers by giving them awards, o¢ ce space, company cars, and, arguably most importantly, promotions.
Given the prominence of status concerns and the widespread use of promotion hierarchies, it is surprising that there are only a few papers in economics that have investigated the design of organizations and incentive contracts in the presence of status concerns (Auriol and Renault 2001 , and Besley and Ghatak, 2008 . 1 The main result of Renault (2001, 2008 ) is that junior workers should get minimal status and …xed wage, and no bonus; their work incentives come solely from the perspective of getting a promotion. This result, 1 however, is derived in a model in which …rms do not …re workers if they are unsuccessful.
In reality, there are two dominant forms of promotion hierarchies, the "internal labor market"and the "up-or-out system". Doeringer and Piore (1971) remarked that …rms maintain internal labor markets in which there are job guarantees, incentives are given through promotion hierarchies, and wages are associated to job titles (see for instance, Baker et al., 1994) . "Up-or-out"exposes employees to more risk and steeper incentives. Employees work for some years as juniors with the explicit or implicit understanding that upon completion of this phase, they will either be promoted or will have to leave the …rm.
We extend the Renault (2001, 2008) framework to provide an explicit comparison of internal labor markets with up-or-out systems. We derive these hierarchies as solutions to a simple dynamic agency model, describe their properties in terms of pro…ts, wages paid to juniors and seniors, and the span of control implied. We determine when one or the other is optimal, generate some empirical predictions, and collect supporting evidence. We also consider heterogeneous workers and endogenize workers'outside options by considering self-employment opportunities.
An important literature has looked at the rationale for …rms to maintain internal labor markets, 2 and up-or-out has attracted much attention among economists as well. 3 However, most of the literature on internal labor markets and up-or-out argues that promotion hierarchies solve contracting issues related to non-veri…able output and speci…c human capital accumulation. In our theory, output is veri…able, and promotion hierarchies are designed in response to human beings'need for status. Indeed, in many sectors in which up-or-out is applied, output is readily observable and veri…able. In academia, the research output of individuals is not only used as the basis for the promotion decisions taken by the university, but also for the allocation of public funds (e.g. in Germany and the UK). In particular, in the natural sciences or economics, the "value"of a scientist in terms of scienti…c output can be determined pretty neatly by looking at their CV. The same is true for investment bankers (the return on the funds invested or the pro…ts generated) or lawyers (size and frequency of cases won, or clients acquired).
In our model, there is one large …rm that o¤ers workers either an internal labor market, or up-or-out. Workers can choose to be self-employed or to work in the large …rm. Three di¤er-ent employment forms are hence generated from the same model: self-employment, internal labor markets, and up-or-out systems. By working in the promotion hierarchy, workers receive the opportunity of gaining additional status. The …rm allocates status among workers by means of job titles or ranks. For incentive purposes, all juniors enjoy the same low status and successful agents receive a large increase in status through promotions. In equilibrium, only productive agents enter the large …rm and as everyone exerts the same e¤ort, workers take a status gamble. Self-employment, in which there is no reallocation of status, 4 is preferred by less productive workers, because they have little to gain from competing for status and incentive pay with more productive types. Thus, promotion hierarchies function as a screening device ensuring that only productive workers enter a …rm, and …rms make pro…ts by using promotion hierarchies.
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The large …rm makes pro…ts because junior workers receive wages below the output they produce. They enjoy little status, but they face steep incentives by the prospect of receiving both a large …xed wage, a substantial bonus and high status in the …rm when promoted upon a success. Thus, both junior and senior workers are exerting more e¤ort than in self-employment. These productivity gains are shared between the …rm and the successful workers who are promoted. An entrepreneur who would hire only one worker or hire more than one worker without di¤erentiating their status would not make pro…ts because workers have the alternative to be self-employed.
We derive the optimal incentive and promotion scheme both for internal labor markets and for up-or-out systems. We identify the situations in which internal labor markets and those in which up-or-out contracts are optimal. We …nd that in terms of the pro…ts of the …rm, up-or-out is always optimal if it is very di¢ cult to achieve a success. When success is less hard to achieve, the internal labor market is optimal provided the payo¤ associated with success is small enough. Otherwise up-or-out is, again, optimal. The results are in line with observations that up-or-out is the predominant system in modern academia, law …rms, investment banks, and top consulting …rms, while internal labor markets dominate where work is less demanding and where payo¤s are more compressed, for instance, in industries that are quite mature and o¤er little growth opportunities, such as manufacturing.
Our theory generates a number of predictions. First, the variance of career success (measured in wages and status) of a cohort entering an internal labor market is lower than the one of a cohort entering an up-or-out hierarchy. Second, juniors work harder in up-orout than in an internal labor market; while this is not necessarily so for seniors. Third, the model predicts di¤erences in the spans of control in up-or-out and in an internal labor market: the ratio of juniors and (in the case of the internal labor market) unsuccessful seniors over successful (promoted) seniors is smaller in up-or-out than in the internal labor market.
The prediction on the span of control seems to be the most fruitful avenue to generate empirical support. 6 We hence have collected some information about the top 50 economics departments in the U.S. (an up-or-out system) and in France (an internal labor market, in which tenure is given at the entry level). The results are in line with the prediction of the model: the span of control in France is more than three times higher than the one in U.S.
research departments.
The next section relates our paper to the literature; Section 3 sets up the model; Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 derives implications and presents our empirical observations. Section 6 concludes. 6 Notice that a large variance in wages is also a natural feature of models in which promotion is a signal. Furthermore, it is hard to compare the e¤ort levels of seniors empirically.
Related Literature
We share a common interest with the existing papers on up-or-out contracts, but there are some notable di¤erences, both in terms of underlying assumptions and predictions. First, Demougin and Siow (1994) and O'Flaherty and Siow (1995) are not about incentives. Rather, …rms decide on either to sta¤ all junior positions with trainees for managerial positions only, or to sta¤ the junior positions also with people who work productively. Whether or not upor-out is optimal depends on demand. In particular, if current demand is low, but growth is high, up-or-out is optimal. We consider a steady state organization, and in our theory, juniors and seniors do the same kind of work, which seems a fair description of law …rms, consulting or academia. The main interest that relates us to Demougin and Siow (1994) and O'Flaherty and Siow (1995) lies in determining the relative sizes of di¤erent hierarchical levels and, thus, the span of control of hierarchies.
The second group of papers is on incentives. Kahn and Huberman (1988) suggest a model in which …rms want to incentivize agents to invest in human capital, but there is limited commitment of the …rms. Output is only observable to the …rm; it thus may pretend that the output is not high enough in order to save on the promised reward. This would undermine the incentive e¤ects of the proposed reward. By announcing that anyone who does not get the reward will be …red, the …rm can commit itself not to cheat, because otherwise it will lose the accumulated human capital of the worker. The model combines bilateral moral hazard with the assumption that output cannot be veri…ed. Prendergast (1993) suggests a model in which promotions, together with wage structures that a …rm can commit itself to, can solve similar problems related to unveri…ability and speci…c human capital acquisition. The assumption of unveri…able output is also present in Waldman (1984) and (1990) and in Ghosh and Waldman (2010) in which promotion is a signal to the outside world about the productivity of a person, while output is not observable to the outside world. Waldman (1984) introduced this idea and then showed (Waldman, 1990 ) that the Kahn and Huberman (1988) model works in a setting with general human capital if promotion as a signal is considered. Ghosh and Waldman (2010) compare standard promotion practices (similar to what we call an internal labor market) with up-or-out, and show that up-or-out is optimal if …rm-speci…c human capital is low. They also show that if the …rm can commit to a wage ‡oor, up-or-out is used when low and high-level jobs are similar.
Our paper is di¤erent from the literature, because we do not focus on the acquisition of speci…c human capital. In our model, promotion systems are used to di¤erentiate the status of workers, for the purpose of generating e¤ort incentives. Human capital is certainly an important element determining optimal promotion systems, but as our theory shows, it is not a necessary condition for an incentive theory of promotion hierarchies to exist. Our theory applies when people care about status and veri…ability of output is not an issue, while the other theories apply when output cannot be veri…ed and people have standard utility functions.
Model
We employ an overlapping generation model. At any date, the organization is sta¤ed with members of two generations. Each person has a work life time of two periods. Juniors enter the organization and work their …rst period, and seniors who joined the organization in the previous period are spending the last period of their working life in the …rm. It is assumed that the population of agents is constant and large so that it may be represented by a continuum. The size of the workforce employed by the …rm is normalized to 2, that is, we look at a …rm in steady state.
The risk-neutral organizational designer maximizes pro…t:
where Q t is total output (its price is normalized to 1 without loss of generality) and W t is the wage bill in period t. The principal's objective function is intertemporally separable with a discount factor 1. In what follows, we set = 1 which is innocuous for our purpose.
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The organizational designer uses two instruments, compensation and allocation of status.
Before setting up the full program of the designer, we describe the production process, workers'preferences, and the feasible allocations of status.
Production
Each worker living at date t, junior or senior, exerts an e¤ort e The larger is a , the more di¢ cult it is for an agent to achieve a high output. 7 In equilibrium the probability of success is inversely related to a . To capture the idea that g workers are more productive than b workers we assume that a b > a g > 0:
7 Equivalently, we could assume (e) = minf e a ; 1g and (e) = 
Preferences
We assume that utilities are additively separable across periods with some discount factor (which we will set to one). Workers are protected by limited liability. In any of the periods an agent with productivity of type , with status s 0, income w 0, and e¤ort level e 0 has the following utility function:
Our assumption that money and status re-enforce each other requires some explanations.
We posit the same utility function as Auriol and Renault (2008) , which is situated between perfect substitutes and perfect complements. The indi¤erence curves for money and status at given e¤ort level are strictly decreasing, thus there is some substitution between status and income. This substitution is however imperfect: a superb job title does not compensate for a wage of nil, nor does a stellar wage make up for a lack of appreciation by others. The utility function also implies that the marginal rate of substitution between e¤ort and income is decreasing in status. Put di¤erently, for a given level of monetary incentives, an agent should be all the more willing to exert e¤ort when she has higher status. Furthermore, the marginal rate of substitution between e¤ort and status is decreasing in income. Thus, individuals with higher income will be willing to exert more e¤ort in order to improve their status. Maslow's (1954) hierarchy of needs is in line with this, and Centers and Bugental (1966) …nd evidence employees earning higher wages care more for factors at the top of Maslow's hierarchy of needs.
These observations indicate that our assumption is a reasonable one, but direct empirical evidence on the shape of utility functions is hard to …nd. While some authors in the literature on status have conjectured that there are the complementarities we assume (for instance, Kosfeld and Neckermann, forthcoming) , systematic evidence about the interplay between status and social recognition, and money is so far lacking in economics. A …rst piece of evidence from experimental economics is by Bradler and Neckermann (2011) who found that in a …eld experiment a monetary reward and a thank-you card (albeit given to everybody) increased performance to some limited extent when given in combination. Evidence on the re-enforcement of money and social recognition exists in industrial psychology. In particular, Stajkovic and Luthans (2003) carry out a meta-analysis of 72 studies with more than 13,000 subjects. They …nd that provided that there is performance feedback (as in our theory in which performance is common knowledge), monetary incentives and social recognition re-enforce each other, as postulated in our theory.
Organizational design
An organization can establish a status ranking of their workers through di¤erent means like the distribution of wages, the allocation of scarce nonmonetary resources, e.g., corner o¢ ces, or, most commonly, the hierarchical structure. Some of these attributes also provide material bene…ts, whereas others are purely symbolic and are valued for the social or psychological bene…ts they entail. We focus on these non-material sources of status, such as rank in the organization.
Any organization will be constrained in its allocation decision because increasing one individual's status comes at the expense of decreasing somebody else's status. We thus assume that status is …rm-speci…c. To be more speci…c the set of feasible social status allocations is characterized as follows (the equality to 2 is a normalization).
For each agent, the organizational designer chooses a social status allocation s i t in (A.1), a …xed wage w i t , and a bonus w i t in case of a high performance. Status is allocated before the workers exert e¤ort. That is, when an agent joins the organization he is assigned to a rank somewhere in the hierarchy. The position is revised at the end of the …rst period based on performance.
There are two sensible promotion hierarchies in our setting. First, in an up-or-out system, successful former juniors are promoted and become seniors, while unsuccessful juniors have to leave. Second, in an internal labor market, again, successful juniors become seniors, but unsuccessful juniors are o¤ered to stay in the …rm and become seniors. We will show though that these unsuccessful seniors will receive a di¤erent …xed wage and status compared to their successful colleagues of the same cohort. Also, in both systems, unproductive types will stay outside of the …rm.
Notice that other promotion hierarchies do not make sense because (i) a company will rationally always employ juniors; (ii) …ring successful seniors would provide negative incentives.
The timing for a cohort joining the organization at date t is as follows.
date 0: A new cohort of workers are o¤ered contracts that include a junior status level, a …xed wage and an incentive wage for the …rst period. The …rm also commits itself to a second-period contract which includes a rule for allocating status, …xed wages and incentive wages contingent on …rst-period performance. The …rm also commits itself whether to provide an employment guarantee or to …re unsuccessful seniors and replace them by new juniors. date 2: Outputs are observed, transfers occur, senior workers retire.
As the outcome q i t which depends on e¤ort at date t is random, some agents will be successful and others not. Then an agent is characterized by its productivity b or g, and by the fact that he is either a junior worker indexed 1, or a senior worker with a history of high past performance, denoted h, or a history of low past performance, denoted l.
Solution of the model 4.1 Outside option
In each period agents can work as individual entrepreneurs outside the …rm; agents have the same kind of productivity inside and outside the …rm. The only di¤erence is that they work individually and, therefore, they cannot change the status allocation in their one-person …rm.
Hence, they also face di¤erent incentives. As each worker is born with one unit of status, the per-period utility of a self-employed is given as
A self-employed agent will choose the optimal e¤ort level e i = q a i for all t. The resulting expected utility is
Since a b > a g ; reservation utility is type-dependent with U g > U b .
Workers'optimal e¤ort choices
In the following, we assume that the …rm is in steady state and consequently drop the time index. We consider …rst the problem of a senior worker at date 1:5. This problem is isomorphic in both promotion hierarchies, although the respective status allocations and wages di¤er. We can thus save on notation in terms of the type of the hierarchy considered.
Let e ip (s p ; w p ; w p ) denote the optimal e¤ort level of senior worker of type i 2 fg; bg with status s p and compensation (w p ; w p ); where index p = l stands for low and h for high past performance. The agent maximizes the following programme:
The …rst-order condition implies:
We consider next the problem of a junior worker of type i maximizing his expected utility, at date t = 0:5. Agent i chooses his e¤ort e i1 to solve:
Here U i = EU ih U i in an up-or-out system and U i = EU ih EU il for the internal labor market. The …rst-order condition implies:
We will restrict the analysis to the meaningful case in which there is an interior solution with respect to e¤ort. This can be guaranteed by assuming a g to be high and q low enough so that in equilibrium e i1 < 1 and e ip 1: a g 37:5q and q 5q: (A.2)
Optimal incentive contracts without status di¤erentiation
We here brie ‡y describe a benchmark case in which the …rm relies only on monetary incentives. Status allocation is constant and identical among workers so that s it = 1 8i; t. In this classical principal/agent problem there is no bene…t for the …rm to postpone rewards. As the agents are risk neutral with respect to income, the optimal dynamic solution is simply the replication of the optimal static solution.
Thus, the …rm maximizes the expected pro…t function with respect to …xed wage and bonus allocation. Assuming that there is a proportion x of good and (1 x) of bad agents, 12 the program is as follows:
subject to
LL stands for limited liability, IC is the incentive compatibility, and IR the individual rationality constraint. In the program above we have implicitly assumed that the …rm is able to sort out workers of type b and g at zero cost.
We can readily show that the optimal solution derived under this assumption is implementable under the more realistic framework of asymmetric information. Under assumption A.2 we get an interior solution for the e¤ort: e i = w i a i
. The IR constraint then writes: Result 1 If status is not di¤erentiated, the pro…t maximizing incentive contract, w = q and w = q, is independent of the type or seniority of workers. Both types of workers are entering the …rm, and the …rm makes zero pro…t. 
Two types of promotion hierarchy
In this subsection we present two propositions describing the wages in the up-or-out system, and in the internal labor market. We then investigate under what conditions either one or the other is optimal for the …rm. The propositions build on one of the main results in Auriol and Renault (2008) , namely that juniors receive zero wages and status (Auriol and Renault, 2008 , Proposition 3). Our main contribution is to investigate the precise shapes of the promotion hierarchy, and to predict under what circumstances either of the two promotion systems is optimal. The paper also shows that a promotion hierarchy acts as a device to make less productive types stay outside of the …rm (which increases pro…ts of the …rm).
In the up-or-out system, the …rm maximizes expected output minus wages, subject to the ex ante participation constraint of the good worker, and the interim participation constraint of a successful worker to be satis…ed. The …rm also faces the status feasibility constraint (A.1) and limited liability constraints.
The following Proposition fully characterizes the optimal up-or-out system. The proof for this and the other propositions can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 In an up-or-out system, unsuccessful former juniors must leave the …rm, while successful juniors are promoted. The optimal up-or-out contract induces sorting, that is, only the good workers apply for jobs in the …rm. Wages and status allocation are as follows: (i) junior workers receive minimum rewards and status (w
The up-or-out hierarchy provides strong incentives to junior workers. By bundling social and material rewards in one state of the world, large …rms create prizes for their workers who are willing to take the gamble to get the prestigious and lucrative promotion. They work harder than in self employment (e ) in the hope to stay on board and receive a substantial increase in status and high wages. The principal actually loses money on the promoted seniors, but this loss is more than compensated by the surplus he extracts from the juniors. A large …rm that o¤ers an up-or-out hierarchy engineers promotion packages that combine social and material rewards, and, through this packaging, makes pro…ts.
The o¤er of a promotion hierarchy also makes it possible to sort out at no cost the most productive workers. Indeed, in up-or-out promotion systems social and monetary rewards are not only delayed in time, as in any promotion system, but they are allocated only to successful employees. With such a structure workers with low ability are less likely to get a reward for their e¤ort. They rather stick to self-employment. The ability to attract the most productive workers and to extract a high level of e¤ort from them creates a competitive edge for large …rms.
The program in the internal labor market has one main di¤erence compared to the upor-out system: in the internal labor market, nobody is …red. Unsuccessful juniors stay in the …rm, but the …rm distinguishes status and wages of successful vs. unsuccessful seniors.
The optimal internal labor market is characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In an internal labor market, all workers stay in the …rm. The optimal internal labor market contract induces sorting, that is, only the good workers apply for jobs in the …rm. Wages and status allocation are as follows: (i) junior workers receive minimum rewards and status (w 
and (iii) unsuccessful seniors receive
Unsuccessful seniors receive a lower status compared to their successful counterparts. In a way similar to the up-or-out contract, a …rm with an internal labor market loses money on both types of seniors, but this loss is more than compensated by the surplus extracted from the juniors.
Both up-or-out and the internal labor market succeed in inducing sorting and in both types of promotion hierarchies, juniors only receive incentives linked to promotion. Seniors have …rst best incentives; they receive the entire surplus associated with a success. Comparing the pro…ts of the …rm in the two systems we can answer the question of optimality of the two systems in the next Proposition.
Proposition 3 A …rm's optimal choice between up-or-out or internal labor market depends on the payo¤ associated to a success q, and the di¢ culty of achieving a success for the productive workers a g : (i) if q is su¢ ciently large compared to q ( 
Implications
The last Proposition establishes that the up-or-out system dominates when the surplus generated by high e¤ort is su¢ ciently large and whenever the di¢ culty of achieving a success is su¢ ciently large. This is in line with casual observations that up-or-out dominates in …elds in which there are large sums at stake or in which people have to work very hard to succeed. Examples include law …rms or consulting …rms in which winning a law suit or a new, important client makes all the di¤erence and people work both intensively and extensively, in particular when …ghting for partnership status. But this also is in line with the arts, as for example in the music business where the "up" consists in a long-term contract with a publishing house, or in science where the "up" is getting tenure. As we all know, in many (but not all) countries scientists are used to be granted tenure only after six to ten years on the job, and not making tenure at a prestigious university is perceived as a substantial loss in expected status.
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Predictions
An applied theory like ours should generate empirical predictions allowing to test it against alternative theories and to corroborate its assumptions. We here …rst discuss some of these testable implications, and then present some descriptive statistics from U.S. and French economics departments, which are in line with a prediction of our theory.
A …rst observation relates to the wage and status pro…les over time. Juniors who enter the up-or-out system have a higher variance in terms of both status and wages than in the internal labor market: successful seniors are promoted to jobs with high wages and high status, while unsuccessful seniors leave to self-employment. In the internal labor market both wage and status pro…les are less steep than under up or out. Most importantly, unsuccessful seniors stay in the …rm and enjoy positive status. Nonetheless, in both systems, juniors are paid minimum wages and receive no status.
A second observation builds on a comparison of e¤ort levels of juniors. Omitting the subscript for the type of worker, because only g type workers enter the …rm, this is e A fourth prediction applies to spans of control as implied by the two promotion systems.
As juniors work harder in an up-or-out hierarchy, there are more successful seniors than in an internal labor market, but not everyone succeeds. Unsuccessful seniors are replaced by new juniors, while in an internal labor market, the unsuccessful seniors stay on. As a consequence, the ratio of juniors and unsuccessful seniors over successful seniors in an ILM is larger than the ratio of juniors over seniors in an up-or-out organization.
An empirical observation in line with the model
The last prediction can be investigated by constructing the ratio with data from U.S. and French economics departments. In the U.S., assistant professors take up to 10 years to receive tenure, usually as full professor, but in many countries in continental Europe, universities give researchers tenure at the entry level. We gathered information about the numbers of full professors, associate and assistant professors from 50 top U.S. research universities as ranked by Dusansky and Vernon (1998), as well as from the largest 50 French economics departments as ranked by Bosquet et al. (2010) .
8 For the U.S. system we count both assistant and associate professors as juniors, leaving aside the fact that there are some places that give tenure on the associate level. For the French system, we use the fact that researchers at universities maintain the entry level "Maitre de conférences" unless they are promoted to the rank of professor through a nation-wide competition. Similarly, researchers in other institution such as the CNRS, the national science center, can either stay on the entry level ("chargé de recherche"), or be promoted ("directeur de recherche").
We can thus compare the ratio of assistant and associate professors over full professors in the U.S. (Table 1) , with the ratio of the so-called Rank B (juniors and non-promoted seniors) to Rank A (senior researchers and professors) in France ( Table 2 ). Notice that U.S. universities are ranked in alphabetical order, while French ones by rank, for reasons explained below. there has been a division of labor between the CNRS, and universities, which are supposed to be more teaching-oriented. While some universities have developed remarkable scienti…c capacity, the research output of most universities is quite low compared to the U.S.. The goals and production technology of French universities and the associated expected payo¤s are hence di¤erent from the ones in U.S. research universities. While in the U.S. it is relatively hard to achieve a success, such as for instance, publications in the American Economic
Review, Econometrica or Science, it is easier to publish in a French-speaking journal or provide undergraduates with reasonable teaching. Similarly, the payo¤s of achieving the respective success are smaller in France than in the U.S..
We …nd another piece of evidence that is in line with our theory (and the reason for arranging french universities by rank). The French university system is currently undergoing a transformation that is quite similar to many other European countries. In the course of this transformation which involves increased autonomy, and funding related to research performance, the di¤erence between the stronger and weaker economics departments is increasing. Only few of the French departments can be meaningfully compared to their U.S.
counterparts in terms of research output. However, a clear picture emerges: while the top 20 departments have a junior/senior ratio of 1.6, the following 30 departments have a ratio of 3.7. This means that the better ranked the departments in terms of scienti…c output, and hence the closer the departments in terms of their mission to the ideal of scienti…c excellence, the less substantial is the di¤erence of the ratio to the U.S. departments.
We would like to point out that these …gures should not be overinterpreted as a test of the model, because a number of institutional speci…cities make it impossible to exclude other factors. In particular, in our model, the …rm is in steady state, and this is de…nitely not the case in France. We nonetheless see these observations as support for our theory.
Concluding remarks
We have suggested a simple dynamic agency model in which …rms can make pro…ts by o¤ering promotion opportunities to successful juniors. The hierarchies di¤er with respect to the treatment of unsuccessful juniors. In up-or-out, these unsuccessful juniors must go, while in the internal labor market they can stay. We have shown that these promotion hierarchies both succeed in inducing sorting: only the more productive workers want to work in these organizations. We have also derived some testable implications, and …nd some corroborative data from the French and the U.S. university system. We have shown that up-or-out is the pro…t maximizing promotion hierarchy for very high payo¤s of successful work of juniors and when the task is causing high costs of e¤ort, while otherwise internal labor markets dominate.
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Proof of Proposition 1
We take Proposition 3 from Auriol and Renault (2008) as given:
Proposition 3 (Auriol and Renault, 2008) : Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, in any steady state of a pro…t-maximizing solution, we have:
w h w l and w h w l
where at least one of the inequalities in (13) is strict.
Thus, juniors receive minimal wages and status. If A.2 holds, a g is such that in equilibrium e U g1 < 1 (i.e., U g < a g ). The following Lemma establishes that e
Lemma 1 Without loss of generality at the optimum:
; then e , and by assumption e
The …rm maximizes expected pro…ts:
= 2 e U g1
1 + e U g1
q + e U gh q w
The Lagrangian is:
It is useful to de…ne
From the Lagrangian, we derive the following conditions:
To derive the optimal up-or-out contract as stated in Proposition 1, we assume that equilibrium satis…es the following two conditions:
After deriving the optimal contract, we will check that (26) is ful…lled in equilibrium, and that (27) is implied by (26).
The following preliminary result is helpful:
Lemma 2 When at the optimum w
Assume that at the optimum w 
(2 w U h + ). By construction, the expected utility of a gh worker is unchanged. However the principal's pro…t changes: she pays more with probability e (26) then imply that h = 0. Substituting h = 0 and b = 0 from (27) in (21) and applying
We now proceed to show that g > 0: Substituting for B in (20), using the fact that h , b = 0; and substituting for w 
From (28) Finally, we need to check that the solution satis…es (26), and (27), and e U g1 < 1, e U gh
1.
We start with (26):
> 0. Substituting for s U h and U g we obtain a su¢ cient condition for this to be ful…lled: 2 s r
LHS is increasing in a g and the RHS decreasing. Given A.2, we can thus set a g = 37:5q. For< 5 (by A.2), the su¢ cient condition is ful…lled.
Second, we check e U g1 < 1. This is equivalent to It is straightforward to check that e U g1 is decreasing and convex in a, and that it is increasing and convex in . It hence reaches its maximum for a = 37:5 and = 5. Equation (47) . By continuity it is still true for lower values of a. When a is very large so that success is di¢ cult, the …rm's pro…t is always higher with up-or-out than with an internal labor market.
We now prove that for low values of it exists a l ( ) > 37:5 such that 
